The wordfamiliarity is used in psychological studies in at least six different ways: (a) the fact that a person has seen an item at least once before (e.g., "We showed novel items (nonwords) and familiar items (words)'*); (b) the fact that items have been encountered in some specific context (e.g., "We presented novel and familiar words in a recognition test*'); ( c ) me sensitivity of performance to prior experience (e.g., "Subjects showed familiarity with the stimuli, naming old stimuli faster than novel ones"); (d) the possession of general, abstract knowledge (e.g., "Are you familiar with the works of Shakespeare?"); (e) the knowledge of specific identity (e.g., "Princess Diana's face is familiar to millions"); and (f) the subjective feeling of having prior experience, whether or not one actually has (e.g., "Your face seems awfully familiar: Do I know you?").
It is the last meaning, the subjective feeling of having encountered a stimulus previously, that was the subject of our investigation. In particular, we were interested in the curious relationship between the subjective feeling of familiarity and objective knowledge of a stimulus. Stimuli belonging to a well-known category, but which are themselves novel in a person's experience, usually do not produce a feeling of familiarity (e.g., the faces in a crowd). In contrast, one can experience a powerful feeling of familiarity on encountering a stimulus about which one knows little Bruce W. A. Whittlesea and Lisa D. Williams, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.
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(e.g., "I'm SURE I've seen that actress before. Who is she?"). However, one usually experiences no such feeling on encountering a well-known stimulus in an ordinary place (e.g., encountering one's spouse in one's own kitchen). In that case, one "just knows" who the person is, without experiencing any powerful feeling of "I've seen you before." As obvious as this phenomenon may seem, we believe that it holds the key to understanding a mechanism that underlies not only the feeling of familiarity but many other subjective states as well, including the feeling of knowing, of having committed an error, of pleasantness, of event duration, and of truth.
Fluency and Familiarity
Intuitively, the source of the feeling of familiarity seems obvious. An encounter with a stimulus creates a trace in memory; another encounter with the stimulus (or a similar one) cues that trace; and this activation causes a resonance in consciousness, producing a feeling of familiarity. By this notion, the feeling of familiarity is a direct consequence of activating representations in memory. Jacoby and Dallas (1981; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1990) instead suggested that the relationship between the feeling of familiarity and representations in memory is indirect, mediated by an unconscious attribution about the fluency of current performance. Prior experience of a stimulus facilitates processing of that stimulus on a later occasion (repetition priming). Thus, when faced with a recognition problem, people could attribute fluent performance to a source in the past. They might do this consciously and deliberately; alternatively, they might perform that inference unconsciously, without awareness of making a decision. By this account, the feeling of familiarity is the 547 conscious state that accompanies an unconscious decision that fluent performance is due to a source in the past.
There is much support for this fluency-attribution account of familiarity. Numerous investigators have demonstrated that subjects are more likely to judge fluently named words to be old than less fluently named items (e.g., Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985; Johnston, Hawley, & Elliott, 1991; Luo, 1993; Verfaillie & Cermak, 1999) . Other investigators have shown that it is possible to cause illusions of familiarity by manipulating the fluency of performance through factors other than prior experience, such as perceptual priming (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993) , semantic context (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Whittlesea, 1993) , or difficulty of presentation (Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1989) . In each of these studies, enhancing the fluency of processing unstudied test stimuli increased claims of recognition.
The above studies might also suggest that the attribution process is based on a simple heuristic, such as "if fluent, then old." However, people do not always experience a feeling of familiarity when processing is fluent. For example, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) demonstrated that when subjects' fluency of processing a test word was enhanced through masked priming, they experienced an illusion of familiarity for that item; but when the prime was presented for a longer duration, the subjects were less likely to claim that item old. This suggests that when people are aware of a reason why processing of a test stimulus might be especially fluent, they do not experience a feeling of familiarity. Moreover, people appear to take into account the amount of fluency that could normatively be expected in processing a particular item as well as their actual fluency. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) observed that prior study enhances the fluency of naming low-frequency words more than that of high-frequency words, although old high-frequency words are still named with greater fluency. They further observed that old low-frequency words are more likely to be claimed old than old high-frequency words. That is, in making recognition decisions, people appear to be impressed not by the fluency of processing per se but by the difference between their actual fluency and the fluency that could ordinarily be expected for that item in that context. Whittlesea and Williams (1998) to propose a reformulation of the basis of familiarity, which emphasizes the perceived coherence of a processing episode, rather than its fluency. We call this reformulation the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the feeling of familiarity is a by-product of the perception and comprehension of stimulus events. As people integrate the various aspects of a stimulus (e.g., orthographic, semantic, and contextual properties) into a unitary construct, they also evaluate the coherence of that processing. This evaluation results in one of three perceptions: (a) that their processing is coherent; (b) that their processing contains incongruous, contradictory elements; or (c) that some aspects of their processing are in some surprising way discrepant with others. In this article, we attempt to demonstrate all three of these perceptions. We further attempt to demonstrate that the feeling of familiarity results from the perception of discrepancy in one's processing.
Such considerations led
The Discrepancy-Attribution Hypothesis Whittlesea and Williams (1998) focused on the observation, alluded to earlier, that strong feelings of familiarity are seldom elicited by faces one knows well (e.g., spouse, friends, etc.) or faces one does not know at all (e.g., strangers in a crowd). Instead, strong feelings of familiarity seem to occur when one has limited knowledge, for example, having met the person only a few times (true familiarity) or when a complete stranger resembles someone one knows (false familiarity). We suspected that these outcomes occur because people expect known faces to be fluently processed and nonfluently processed faces to be unknown; that is, they expect a match between the fluency of perceiving and the coming-to-mind of identity information. Fluent processing of a friend's face meets this expectation; so does nonfluent processing of a stranger's face. However, limited prior experience, or similarity to a friend, may augment the fluency of processing a current face without enabling retrieval of identity for that face. In that case, the fluency is surprising. We suspected that in such cases, people unconsciously attribute the unexplained fluency to a prior experience and consciously experience a feeling of familiarity. By this account, the basis of the feeling of familiarity is the perception of a discrepancy between the fluency of processing and failure to produce the person's identity, rather than the fluency per se.
To test this idea, we designed three sets of items. One was a set of natural words (e.g., STATION, DAISY, TABLE; see Appendix A) that would be easy to say, and whose meanings are well-known. These items were meant to correspond to well-known friends, both in perceptual ease and knowledge of identity. A second set consisted of orthographically irregular nonwords (e.g., STOFWUS, LICTPUB, GERT-PRIS) that would be harder to pronounce and that would not resemble any particular real words. These items were our analog of strangers, having no retrievable identity (meaning) and being dissimilar in perceptual form to known words. A third set consisted of orthographically regular nonwords (e.g., HENSION, BARDLE, BRENDER) that would be easy to pronounce and that would resemble a number of natural words (e.g., HENS10N resembles apprehension, prehensile, pension, etc.). These words were intended to correspond to the third case-a face that is easy to process perceptually but for which no identity comes to mind.
Half of each set was exposed in a training session in which subjects simply named each item. At test, subjects were shown those items plus unstudied items of all three types. Unstudied words were pronounced about 150 ms faster than unstudied HENSION-type items and about 450 ms faster than unstudied STOFWUS-type items (see Table  1 ). TTius, if fluency per se is responsible for the feeling of familiarity, we should observe most false alarms in recognizing words and least for irregular nonwords. However, our subjects produced false alarms for HENSION items on 37% of the trials, which was much more often than for natural words (16%) or STOFWUS items (9%).
We concluded that the illusion of familiarity for the regular nonwords resulted from the perception of a discrepancy between initial and later aspects of processing. Natural Note. Hie data in Columns 1-4 are from Whittlesea and Williams (1998) . <f L and C L are indexes of discrimination and bias, like d' and p (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) .
words were named quickly, but that fluency was consistent with the outcome (realizing that they are well-known items); irregular nonwords were named slowly, but again that lack of fluency was consistent with the outcome (realizing that they are unknown). In both of these cases, the subjects produced low rates of false alarms. In contrast, fluent processing of the regular nonwords violated the subjects' expectation that nonwords would be named slowly, causing a perception of discrepancy. 1 There was of course no real discrepancy: The orthographic regularity of those items made them easy to process as coherent units. However, orthographic regularity is an abstract, nonsalient property that is difficult to appreciate: The HENSION items do not feel regular; they feel word-like. Trie subjects unconsciously attributed their fluency of processing to the only other plausible source, namely a prior presentation, and consequently experienced a (false) feeling of familiarity. Thus, processing fluency was involved in the decision that the subjects made about all three item types. However, processing fluency did not directly produce the feeling of familiarity. Instead, that feeling was caused by the subjects' inability to integrate the perceived fluency of processing the HEN-SION items with the realization that those stimuli are meaningless, unknown units. The two stimulus aspects (fluency and meaningfulness) were perceived as coherent for words and irregular nonwords; they were (falsely) perceived as being discrepant for regular nonwords.
Therefore, we argued that illusory feelings of familiarity are caused by the perception of discrepancy. We suggested that true feelings of familiarity may occur in the same way. Prior experience of a stimulus facilitates processing on a subsequent occasion and produces a feeling of familiarity. However, that feeling is not directly due to the fluency itself. Instead, it is based on the perception of a discrepancy between the actual fluency of processing and the fluency one could expect for that stimulus, given what else comes to mind about it.
Our demonstration of illusory familiarity with the HEN-SION stimuli left many issues unanswered. One was that the effect was only observable in the false alarms (see Table 1 ); in fact, the subjects achieved more hits on words in that study than on the regular nonwords. We address that issue in Experiment 1 of the present article. A second issue is related to the fact that the HENSION items were deliberately designed to be of high orthographic regularity. Therefore, it was possible that the high rate of false alarms for those items was due not to their combination of fluency and meaninglessness but simply to their orthographic or phonological similarity to words in general. We examine that issue in Experiment 2.
Although those issues are important for understanding the HENSION effect, the major issue of this article has to do with the standard that people use to evaluate their processing of HENSION-type items. This issue is illustrated by the Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) study mentioned earlier. Jacoby and Whitehouse presented a prime word in advance of some target words in a recognition test The prime was either the same word as the target or a different word and was presented either long enough for conscious identification or too quickly for the subject to realize it had been presented. When the prime was the same as the target, but presented too quickly for conscious identification, the subjects produced more false alarms than in the no-prime control condition; when it was presented long enough for conscious identification, false alarms were actually lower than in the control condition. Jacoby and Whitehouse interpreted this to mean that the matching prime increased the fluency of processing the target, relative to the no-prime condition, but later, the subjects discounted the extra fluency of processing the target when the source was evident but unconsciously attributed it to a prior experience of that item when they were unaware of the prime. That is, the subjects interpreted the significance of their fluency of processing the target in terms of what else they became aware of within the context of the test trial. In our terms, the subjects perceived the extra processing fluency as being discrepant with their expectation for that item when they were unaware of the prime, but as merely coherent with the context when they were aware of the prime. The (false) perception of discrepancy in the former case caused the subjects to attribute their performance to an earlier experience of the item, producing an illusion of familiarity; the perception of coherence in the latter case enabled the subjects to avoid experiencing the extra fluency as familiarity. Jacoby and Whitehouse's (1989) study demonstrated that the feeling of familiarity results from an evaluation process that takes into account not only the fluency of processing an item but also an expectation or standard about how one normatively should perform with that item. It was the difference between this expectation and outcome that pro- 1 We suspect that the perception of fluency for the HENSION items is based on more than their sheer speed of pronunciation. We would not expect similar results for nonwords like P1F and TEP. Although they are regular, in the sense of containing highfrequency bigrams, and fluent, in the sense that they can be said very quickly, they are not much like real words, nor do they cause a perception of processing fluently. Our stimuli were two or more syllables, requiring some degree of involvement in their processing. We suspect that this is important for the perception of fluency, in the same way that fast striking of a single piano key would not feel fluent but fast playing of an orderly series of notes would. Further, the HENSION items were all designed to be specifically similar to one or more common natural words (HENSION) or to contain parts of common words put together in fluent combinations (PENDON). They are not just orthographically regular in a statistical sense but are actually similar to well-practiced words. duced the illusion of familiarity. Their observations also showed that the standard incorporates information about the likely influence of context on one's processing as well as information about the item itself. When their subjects were aware of the prime, they adjusted their standard for evaluating the fluency of processing the target, so mat its greater fluency did not lead them into error. We believe that this same act of integrative evaluation, attempting to make sense of each aspect of processing in terms of others, is responsible for the HENSION effect. However, the HENSION effect that we observed in our prior studies was not produced by attempting to integrate knowledge about a context item with fluency of processing the target; no context items were presented. Instead, we believe it was caused by attempting to integrate two aspects of processing the stimulus itself: the fairly high fluency of processing (caused by its regularity) and the expectation that nonwords should be nonfluently processed. That expectation resulted in a perception of discrepancy that is similar to that experienced by Jacoby and Whitehouse's subjects and consequently produced a feeling of familiarity.
In Experiments 3-5, we explore this integrative evaluation further by studying the effects of broad and local context on judgments about the HENSION items. In Experiment 3, we examine whether the standard that people apply to their evaluation of the HENSION items is affected by the presence or absence of other classes of stimuli, such as highor low-frequency words, within the experiment. In Experiment 4, we examine the effects of variation in local context by presenting the HENSION items in isolation or in the context of a rhyming item. Unlike Jacoby and Whitehouse's (1989) study, the context item was presented after the target item. In this case, the context could not affect the fluency of processing the target item. Instead, it could only affect the feeling of familiarity by influencing the subjects* interpretation of the fluency they had already experienced. Finally, in Experiment 5, we examined the effect of placing the HENSION items within contexts that would emphasize semantic processing. We thought that this might change the subjects' basis for evaluating the HENSION items, causing them to think of those items as simply meaningless, rather than surprisingly fluent. If they did so, then they might fail to perceive the HENSION items as discrepant and consequently fail to experience a feeling of familiarity.
Together, these experiments illustrate an evaluation mechanism that takes into account a variety of aspects of processing of the stimulus and its context, attempting to make as much sense as possible about whatever aspects are salient within the episode (cf. Marcel, 1983) . This integrative evaluation appears to have three major possible outcomes: The perception that the various aspects of processing are (a) coherent, (b) discrepant in some way, or (c) flatly incongruent Of these three outcomes, the perception of discrepancy appears to be the cause of feelings of familiarity.
Experiment 1: Recall and Familiarity
Many recognition studies have been conducted using two or more types of stimuli, such as words of high versus low frequency or concreteness. A common result of mixing different types of stimulus is a mirror effect, in which one type produces higher hits but also lower false alarms than the other type (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1985 Greene & Thapar, 1994; Hintzman, 1994; Stretch & Wixted, 1998) . In contrast, the HENSION items do not produce a mirror effect. Including the experiments in this article, we have conducted 14 replications of the effect In all of those studies, subjects produced more false alarms for regular nonwords than for words; in all but one (the very first study we conducted; see Table 1 ), we also observed more hits for regular nonwords than words. The HENSION effect thus appears to be the result of bias in the recognition decision process. The purpose of this article was to discover the source of this bias and to examine its generality as a basis for feelings of familiarity.
However, in most of our studies, the effect was Larger and more reliable in false alarms than in hits. We believe that this reflects a difference in the recallability of the two types of stimuli, not a difference in the feeling of familiarity associated with them. Hits can be achieved through actual recollection of the prior experience, in addition to guessing or a feeling of familiarity. In contrast, false alarms obviously cannot be produced by recall. Moreover, natural words and nonwords are likely to be encoded in different ways, resulting in differences in the elaborateness or distinctiveness of the traces, and are also likely to be differentially effective as retrieval cues. As a consequence, hits for words are more likely to be based on actual recall than are nonword hits. In contrast, efficiency of encoding and retrieval are irrelevant for the false-alarm data, because there is no trace to form or retrieve. Hence differences in false alarms, unlike differences in hits, can be directly interpreted as differences in the feeling of familiarity for the two kinds of item.
2
We tested these ideas by conducting a recognition experiment similar to one performed by Gardiner and Java (1990, Experiment 2) . Like them, we asked the subjects to subdivide their claims of remembering into cases in which they actually recalled the prior experience of the item from cases in which the item felt familiar, but no detail of the previous encounter came to mind. Also like the Gardiner and Java study, we used both words and nonwords in training and test. However, Gardiner and Java used monosyllabic nonwords such as LORT, KLIB, and ABST, deliberately avoiding 2 False alarms can also occur through false recall, rather than just through a false feeling of familiarity, as shown by Roediger and McDermott (1995; McDermott & Roediger, 1996 ; also see Arndt & Hirshman, 1998; Lindsay & Read, 1994) . However, those authors induced false recall by providing the person with a schema during training: a coherent set of items, thematically related to the test item. The effect of that is to allow the person to experience the test item in an imaginal context, "recalling" contextual detail of the prior experience. In contrast, our unstudied word and nonword test items were not related to the training sets in any systematic way. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that our subjects selectively experienced more false recall for regular nonwords than for words. Instead, we believe that it is the relative fluency of words and nonwords (and the discrepancy of that fluency from what could be expected) that was the basis of our effect. Manipulations of fluency at test cause differences in the feeling of familiarity not differences in false recall (Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Rajaram, 1993). items that looked like words. As discussed earlier, we would not expect such items to produce a false-familiarity effect, and indeed, Gardiner and Java observed tittle difference in false alarms for words versus nonwords. However, we did expect to see a selective false-familiarity effect using the HENSION items, which were deliberately constructed to be word-like.
Method
Subjects. Seventeen Simon Fraser University students participated for course credit.
Procedure. The stimuli consisted of a set of 60 orthographically regular nonwords and 60 natural words created by Whittlesea and Williams (1998) . These items are shown in Appendix A, Columns 1 and 2. The nonwords were structured to contain soft and blended consonants, glide transitions between syllables, and letter combinations that occur with high frequency in English in general and also in particular words (see Footnote 1). As demonstrated by Whittlesea and Williams (1998), these regular nonwords (the HENSION set) are processed fluently and are named almost as quickly as natural words (see Table 1 ).
The subjects were shown 40 words and 40 nonwords in a training phase. All items were randomly selected from their respective pools and shown in random order, with the selection and order being freshly randomized for each subject They were asked to name each item in preparation for a later memory test. Each item was exposed until the subject struck a key. In the subsequent test, 20 of the words and 20 nonwords used in training were shown again, together with the remaining 20 items of each type that had not been selected for training. Subjects were asked to pronounce each test item and then perform a recognition judgment. This judgment was made on a 3-point scale, which consisted of the categories recall seeing that item (1), feels familiar (2), and new (3). We report discrimination and bias indexes calculated as the logistics d]_ and CL (cf. Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . A significance level of p < .05 is assumed throughout.
Results and Discussion
We first examined the subjects' total claims of remembering, adding claims of recall to claims of a feeling of familiarity. As can be seen in Table 2 (Columns 1 and 2), the subjects achieved 5% more hits for nonwords than words, but that effect was not reliable, F < 1. However, they also produced 8% more false alarms on nonwords than words, F(l, 16) = 4.91, MSE = 0.01. On the basis of this evidence, one might want to conclude that the lexical status of the items only influenced claims of remembering when items were new at test (i.e., only false alarms).
However, claims of actual recall were 13% greater for old words than old nonwords, F(l, 16) = 5.09, MSE = 0.03; for new items, there was no difference in claimed recall between words and nonwords, F < 1. The former difference shows that the natural words were easier to effectively encode, retrieve, or both, than the nonwords. This difference is not of interest in the current project, which focuses on the source of the feeling of familiarity, not the source of accuracy in recall. The extra ability to recall old words inflated the hit rate for those items, hiding the effect of lexical status on the feeling of familiarity. The act of recall may or may not have been accompanied by a feeling of familiarity, but the differential rate of recall prevents interpretation of the hits in terms of that feeling.
We next examined trials on which the subjects did not claim to recall the item. First, we analyzed the raw probabilities ( Table 2 , absolute claims of familiarity). Old nonwords caused 18% more claims of familiarity than old words, F(l, 16) = 8.37, MSE = 0.03, and new nonwords 8% more claims than new words, F(l, 16) = 9.62, MSE = 0.01. Second, we recalculated the probabilities of claiming familiarity as a proportion of trials on which the subject did not claim recall ( Table 2 , proportional claims of familiarity). When analyzed in that way, old nonwords produced 13% more claims than old words, F(l, 16) = 6.04, MSE = 0.03, and new nonwords produced 15% more claims than new words, F(l, 16) = 9.16, MSE = 0.01. That is, regardless of the method of analysis, nonwords produced substantially more claims of a feeling of familiarity than did natural words, both in hits and in false alarms.
We concluded that the nonwords produced extra feelings of familiarity compared with words, for old test items as well as new ones, but that the effect of that factor on old items was obscured by the extra recallability of the words. That is likely the reason that in our original experiment (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998; see Table 1 ), hits were actually higher for natural words than for regular nonwords, whereas false alarms were considerably greater for nonwords than for words. We concluded that the false-alarm rates offer a more direct, uncontaminated index of differences in the feeling of familiarity. In fact, in the experiments to follow, whenever we observed false-alarm rates to be greater for HENSION items than words, we also observed higher hits for HENSION items than words: The hit data do not contradict the conclusions to be drawn from the false alarms. However, the effect was always larger in the false alarms than in the hits, which was a consequence, we (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) .
believe, of the differential recallability of the words and nonwords demonstrated in this study. We therefore concentrated on the false-alarm data as the primary evidence about the feeling of familiarity.
Experiment 2: Orthographic Regularity
As discussed earlier, we suggest that regular nonwords like HENSION feel familiar because they unexpectedly turn out to be unknown units, whereas more fluently processed natural words like DAISY feel less familiar because they are known units, so that their fluency is unsurprising. However, there might be an alternate explanation for the effect. The HENSION-type nonwords were deliberately created to consist of common letter combinations and to be easy to pronounce, but the DAISY-type natural words were selected simply on the basis that they were easy to pronounce. Therefore, it was possible that our regular nonwords actually consisted of higher linguistic-frequency units than our words. In that case, our observation of high false alarms for the regular nonwords might have had nothing to do with a discrepancy between aspects of processing. Instead, it might simply have reflected the difference in regularity of our items.
Method
Subjects. Eighteen Simon Fraser University students participated in Experiment 2, for a chance to win a lottery.
Procedure. We selected 120 natural English words. Each possessed two or three syllables, was a well-known word, and began with a consonant We generated 120 nonwords from the words by substituting a different consonant for the first letter of each word (see Appendix B). For example, the words VESSEL, BURDEN, and GAMBLE produced the nonwords MESSEL, PURDEN, and HAMBLE. Care was taken to match the frequency of first-letter substitutions: For example, the first letters of GARDEN and BLENDER were interchanged, producing BARDEN and GLENDER. We also ensured that the initial bigram of the words (e.g., GA-, BL-) and the initial bigram of the resulting nonwords (e.g., BA-, GL-) were of high linguistic frequency. We used only words that produced nonwords that would be pronounced in the same way as the root word. For example, it is unclear whether MEKTA1N (produced from CERTAIN) should be pronounced to rhyme with CURTAIN or PERTAIN, and so it was excluded. In contrast, PINGLE (from SINGLE) has only one pronunciation and so was used.
Because of the generation rules, the nonwords were as orthographically and phonologically regular as the words. They would have the same lexical neighborhood size (or at least, the nonwords would all have one more lexical neighbor than the words, although the words would of course have themselves as a neighbor in memory), the same number of syllables, the same frequency of letter combinations, and so on. The only difference between the sets was that the words were known orthographic units, whereas the nonwords were novel units.
For each subject, we selected 60 words at random from the stock and the 60 nonwords derived from the unused words (e.g., if SINGLE was selected, PINGLE was not). In a training phase, subjects were shown 40 words and 40 nonwords, one at a time, in a freshly randomized order. The subjects were asked to pronounce each item, in anticipation of an unspecified memory test. Each item was exposed until the subject struck a key to expose the next item.
In the test, 20 words and 20 nonwords used in training were shown again, together with the remaining 20 items of each type that had not been shown previously. These items were shown in a freshly randomized order. Hie subjects were asked to perform three tasks on each test item: (a) to pronounce it (striking the middle of three keys as they did so), (b) to decide if it were a word or nonword (striking the left or right key to indicate their decision), and (c) to decide if it had been presented in training (again striking the left or right key). Naming latency, lexical decision latency and accuracy, and recognition accuracy were recorded separately, through the keystrokes. We report pronunciation latencies as an index of processing fluency. We and others have argued that such latencies are not direct indices of fluency (Poldrack & Logan, 1998; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998) , which is more likely experienced as subjective ease than as speed. We offer the pronunciation latencies only because there is currently no more direct index of the psychologically effective state. We do not claim that the recorded latencies are exclusive measurements of naming and of lexical decision: Clearly, subjects may have been thinking about the lexical status of the word while trying to pronounce it
Results and Discussion
Results are shown in Table 3 . Novel words were named faster than nonwords, F(l, 17) = 19.91, MSE = 9,755.00, and also judged faster in the lexical decision task, F(l, 17) = 6.12, MSE = 51,126.00. Taking the two tasks together, subjects processed unstudied words about 330 ms faster than unstudied nonwords, F(l, 17) = 13.98, MSE = 71,484.00. That difference is clearly attributable to the subjects' preexperimental knowledge of the words.
Thus, the words and nonwords were of equal regularity, but the words were named somewhat faster. If fluency of processing directly controls feelings of familiarity, then words should produce higher false alarms than nonwords; if regularity directly controls familiarity, then words and nonwords should produce equal false alarms. In contradiction of both those alternatives, we observed 15% more false alarms for nonwords than for words, F(l, 17) -12.32, MSE = 0.02, again replicating the basic effect observed by Whittlesea and Williams (1998) .
This result demonstrates that the feeling of familiarity is not directly produced either by processing fluency or orthographic regularity. Instead, we suggest that feeling occurs for the HENSION items because they are both fluent (regular, word-like) and unknown. The subjects adopted an unrealistic expectation, that fluently processed items should turn out to be real words (or conversely, that nonwords should be nonnuently processed). In consequence, the fluency of processing these regular nonwords often exceeded their expectation. In turn, the perception of discrep- Note. d L and C L are indices of discrimination and bias, like d' and f$ (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) .
ancy between those aspects led them to attribute the fluency to another source, an experience of that item in the past, resulting in a false feeling of familiarity.
Experiment 3: Manipulations of Broad Context
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that HENSION items attract higher hits and especially higher false alarms than the natural words, even though they are less fluently processed. The natural words were included in the study simply as a baseline against which performance on the nonwords could be compared. However, we realized that the effect could actually be caused by the inclusion of the natural words. The idea is that, because the subjects had no prior experience of dealing with these nonwords, they might not have had any particular expectation about how fluently they should be able to name them. Presenting them along with natural words might have enabled the subjects to realize that their processing of the nonwords in the naming test was nearly as fluent as their processing of the real words, producing the perception of discrepancy. In that case, their evaluation of the implications of fluency in naming nonwords might actually have been based on their experience of naming natural words in the study.
Alternatively, the high rate of false alarms for the nonwords might have had nothing to do with the inclusion of natural words. The subjects might simply have assumed some expectation about the quality of their processing of nonwords, such as "nonwords should be hard, because I don't know them. I should stumble in speaking them and have trouble putting their parts together." This assumption would often be violated by fluent naming of the nonwords, caused by their orthographic regularity. In that case, their standard for evaluating the implications of fluent naming of nonwords would be based only on their conjectures about the likely effects of prior exposure and novel structure on their performance.
We tested those alternatives in Experiment 3, by varying the kind of natural words in the study. In all conditions of the study, we presented HENSION items in training and test. Across the conditions, we added and removed classes of natural words. In Experiment 3a, we presented common words (e.g., DAISY) in training and test, as in our previous studies, but also added rare words (e.g., ADJUNCT, DIN-GHY, MACHETE) in training only. In Experiment 3b, we again presented common words in training and test and presented rare words only in the test. In Experiment 3c, in addition to the common words, we presented easy words (e.g., PART, MILL, BANK) in both training and test. In Experiment 3d, we removed the common words, presenting only HENSION stimuli and easy words in training and test Finally, in Experiment 3e, we removed all words from the study, presenting only HENSION items in training and test The question was whether the subjects' experience of these other classes of stimuli within the study would influence their interpretation of their performance on the HENSION items, thereby influencing their feelings of familiarity for those items.
Method
Subjects. Fifteen Simon Fraser University undergraduates participated in Experiment 3a, 15 in Experiment 3b, 19 in Experiment 3c, 20 in Experiment 3d, and 25 in Experiment 3e, for an opportunity to win a lottery.
Materials. The target stimuli, used in all five conditions, consisted of the set of 60 orthographicaUy regular nonwords created by Whittlesea and Williams (1998; see Appendix A). The natural words used in the various studies were designed to give the subjects different experiences of how fluently words could be identified in the experimental setting. In Experiments 3a and 3b, we used the set of 60 common natural words that had been used by Whittlesea and Williams (1998) as well as a set of 60 rare words (e.g., ABSCESS, MAESTRO, BICUSPID). These words were also primarily Disyllabic, although a few wete trisyllabic. Common and rare words were selected as ones that our subjects would likely identify relatively quickly versus slowly. The selection was validated empirically by the observed naming and lexical decision latencies (see Table 4 ). hi Experiment 3c, we replaced the rare words with a set of monosyllabic, four-letter words (e.g., PART, HOME, MILK), all of which were common words. Again, we did not evaluate the orthographic regularity or frequency of these items; they were chosen to be words that our subjects could identify very quickly and validated by observed response latencies (see Table 4 ). In Experiment 3d, we used only the nonwords and four-letter, monosyllabic words. In Experiment 3e, we used only the nonwords.
Procedure. In Experiment 3a, subjects were shown 40 common words, 40 rare words, and 40 nonwords in a training phase. All items were randomly selected from their respective pools and shown in random order, with the selection and order being freshly randomized for each subject. They were asked to name each item in preparation for a later memory test. Each item was exposed until the subject struck a key. hi the subsequent test, 20 of the common words and 20 nonwords used in training were shown again, together with the remaining 20 items of each type that had not been selected for training. No rare words, old or new, were shown in this test. The subjects were asked to perform two tasks on each test item: to pronounce the word (striking the middle of three telegraph keys as they did so) and to decide if the word had been presented in training (striking the left or right key). Naming latency and recognition accuracy were recorded from the keystrokes. We required that subjects claim to recognize at least 50% of old items to be included in the final analysis; most subjects met this criterion. In Experiment 3b, the procedure was the same, except that rare words were shown only in test. The training thus consisted of 40 common words and 40 nonwords, and the test consisted of 40 common words (half old), 40 nonwords (half old), and 20 rare words (ail new), presented in a freshly randomized order. In Experiment 3c, we presented 40 common words, 40 nonwords and 40 monosyllabic words in training and half of each of those sets plus 20 unstudied items of each type in test. In Experiment 3d, we removed the common words, presenting only 40 nonwords and 40 monosyllabic words in training and half of each of those sets plus 20 unstudied items of each type in test In Experiment 3e, we used only nonwords, presenting 40 items in training and half of those plus 20 unstudied items in test. To keep the memory load in the training task similar to that in the other studies, we created 40 more regular nonwords, randomly interspersing them among the critical items. These fillers were not shown in test.
Results and Discussion
Common words (e.g., TABLE) were pronounced faster than nonwords (e.g., HENSION) in Experiment 3a, F(l, 14) -4.13, MSE = 67,511.00; in Experiment 3b, f (1,14) = 6.88, MSE = 26,516.00; and Experiment 3c, F(l, 18) = 18.81, MSE = 7,344.00 (see Table 4 ). Rare words (e.g., ADJUNCT) were named in test only in Experiment 3b; they were named slower than common words, F(l, 14) = 8.73, MSE = 9,631.00. Monosyllabic words (e.g., MILK) were named faster than common polysyllabic words in Experiment 3c, F(l, 18) = 4.26, MSE = 5,106.00, and faster than nonwords in Experiment 3d, F(l, 19) = 29.22, MSE = 21,524.00. Thus, our intended manipulations of the fluency of words in the various studies appeared to be valid. The question was whether the inclusion of these various classes of words would affect recognition decisions about the HENSION stimuU.
There are two ways to evaluate the effect of manipulating the classes of words. One is to examine the absolute rates of false alarms for the HENSION items across conditions. This measure could be applied across all five studies, because the same set of regular nonwords was used in each study. False alarms for nonwords in Experiments 3a-3e were .31, .32, .36, .28 and .33, respectively. Across these conditions, there is no evidence of a systematic influence of adding or removing hard or easy words. Even when all words were entirely removed (Experiment 3e), the rate of false alarms remained high.
The second way to evaluate the effect of the manipulation is to examine the difference between false alarms on the regular nonwords (HENSION) and on the set of common, multisyllabic words (DAISY). This evaluation is perhaps more fair, because it takes into account variations in subjects between groups. Both of those sets of items were used in Experiments 3a-3c. HENSION items produced 14% more false alarms than common words when rare words were added to the training list, 20% more when rare words were presented in test, and 13% more when the rare words were replaced by easy words. Although there is fluctuation in the size of the difference across these conditions, it is not systematically related to the type of words in the study. Instead, in these studies, we replicated the original finding that stimulated these investigations: that regular nonwords are less fluently processed than common words, but produce greater feelings of familiarity. We concluded that the stanTable4 dard our subjects used to evaluate their processing of the nonwords was based on their assumptions about nonwords per se, not on their experience of other classes of stimuli.
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This led us to consider the source and stability of that standard. One possibility is that the standard is based simply on the fact that nonwords are meaningless and unknown units, so that a perception of discrepancy is inevitable with such items. Alternatively, the subjects' evaluation of their processing of the HENSION items might have taken into account characteristics of the local context within which they were encountered. In that case, the subjects might have come to different interpretations of their fluency of processing those items in different circumstances.
Experiment 4: Discrepancy and Coherence
We believe that the perception of discrepancy that occurs when HENSION stimuli are encountered in isolation (Experiments 1-3) is caused by the feeling that one ought to be able to do something more with them. On encountering a natural word, such as RAINBOW, one can fluently integrate its features into a single orthographic unit and produce a phonological utterance. The fluency of this processing leads one to expect that one can do more with it, such as produce its meaning. Of course, ordinarily one can do just that: The result is that the event matches the expectation, causing a perception of coherence for that event and consequently low false feelings of familiarity. An encounter with HENSION causes similarly fluent orthographic and phonological processing. We suggest that it initially causes the same expectation to be able to do more with the item. It is the violation of this expectation that causes the perception of discrepancy. Thus, we reasoned that if we could cause the subjects to discover that they could do more with the HENSION items (something, obviously, other than meaning processing), they might experience the event as being coherent rather than discrepant.
In Experiment 4, we presented only regular nonwords in training and test. At test, new and old items were shown; half of each were presented in isolation for the recognition judgment, as in previous studies. The other half were presented in the context of a rhyme judgment. Each target (e.g., HNGLE) was shown with two other nonwords (e.g., BINGLE and PINGET). The subjects indicated which item rhymed with the target and then judged the target for recognition. Thus, on these trials, before deciding if the target felt familiar, the subjects could experience the ability to do something with it, something beyond the simple ability to pronounce it fluently. If this experience caused the subjects to perceive their processing of the target stimuli as coherent rather than discrepant, then they should experience less often a feeling of familiarity on rhyming trials than on trials in which targets were presented in isolation.
Method
Subjects. Twenty Simon Fraser University students participated for course credit.
Procedure. We used the 120 regular nonwords used in Experiment 2. In a training phase, the subjects were shown 60 items, with the selection and order being freshly randomized for each subject. They were asked to name each item in preparation for a later memory test. In the subsequent test, all items used in training were shown again, together with the remaining 60 items. Half of each of the old and new items were presented in isolation, one at a time, in the center of the screen. The subjects pronounced these items and then performed a recognition decision. The remaining items were also presented one at a time, in the center of the screen; the subjects named them, hitting a key as they did so. A pair of flankers was then shown, one flanker on either side of the target, with two print spaces separating adjacent items. The flankers consisted of one rhyming and one nonrhyming nonword (e.g., RESSEL MESSEL MISSEL; CLABNER CLANTER PLANTER). As those examples suggest, rhyming items always differed from the target only in the initial letter, nonrhyming items differed from the target on other letters but were of the same length. The side on which the rhyming item was presented was randomized, with the restriction that half were presented on the right side and half on the left The subjects were asked to strike a key to indicate which side the rhyming item was on and men perform a recognition decision on the target item. The sequence of presenting old and new items, and of items in isolation and rhyming contexts, was randomized freshly for each subject. On each trial, the subjects were warned, through a message on the screen, about which type of test trial (isolated or rhyming context) was about to occur.
Results and Discussion
Unlike the previous experiments, the independent variable in this experiment was a processing manipulation rather than a comparison of classes of items differing in lexical status. Because items in the two conditions were the same type, the problem discussed in Experiment 1 (of a differential efficiency in encoding old items, retrieving old items, or both, affecting the interpretability of the hits) did not arise in this study. Consequently, in this study the hit data are as informative about the source of the feeling of familiarity as are the false alarms.
The subjects discriminated well between old and new items, F(h 19) = 100.08, MSE = 0.03 (see Table 5 ). In addition, presenting items in the rhyming context led to 4 Experiments 3d and 3e also provided a different clue to the familiarity puzzle. In those studies, the subjects should have had no doubt about the lexical status of the nonwords, even before they began pronouncing them (in Experiment 3d because natural words and nonwords always differed in length and in Experiment 3e because no natural words were presented). Similarly, Whittlesea and Williams (1998, Experiments 5 and 6) observed high rates of false alarms on regular nonwords even when subjects were told in advance of each trial whether the item would be a word or a hard or easy nonword. In all these cases, the feeling of familiarity occurred without subjects developing an initial, false expectation that the item would turn out to be a word. Instead, we suspect that the discrepancy in these cases occurred in the opposite direction: Knowing in advance that the item was not a word, the subjects developed an initial expectation that it would be difficult to process and were consequently surprised at how fluently they could process it. We suspect that, in general, expectations can be developed at any stage, either in advance of encountering an item or in the early stages of processing it; however, regardless of the order in which people develop expectations about lexical status and fluency, fluent processing is discrepant with the idea that the item is unknown. By not being attributable to prior experience of the stimulus outside of the experiment, the fluency is attributed to prior experience within the experiment and is experienced as a feeling of familiarity. about 10% fewer claims of remembering than did isolated presentation, F(l, 19) = 21.40, MSE = 0.01. The two factors interacted, with the effect of type of presentation being larger for old items than new ones, F(l, 19) = 11.76, MSE = 0.01. However, even for new items, rhyming context caused reliably fewer claims of recognition (23%) than isolated presentation (28%), F(l, 19) = 5.65, MSE = 0.01. This reduction in recognition claims could not have been mediated by differences in the fluency of processing the target items because on context trials, the flankers were not shown until target items had been presented and pronounced; that is, the target items were initially processed in isolation, just as they were in the other condition. Instead, we believe that the difference in claims of recognition resulted from the subjects 1 incorporating different kinds of information in evaluating their performance. We suggest that when items were presented in isolation, the subjects focused on the meaninglessness of the nonwords. They could not easily integrate that meaninglessness with their fluent pronunciation of those items. In consequence, they experienced a perception of discrepancy between those aspects-that the item was surprisingly fluent for a nonword. In the context of a recognition judgment, they attributed the apparently excessive fluency of processing to a source in the past, resulting in a feeling of familiarity. In contrast, when presented with a rhyming judgment before the recognition judgment, they instead experienced the ability to use the stimulus to perform another task fluently. That ability was perceived as consistent with their fluent pronunciation of the targets, producing a perception of coherence of processing rather than discrepancy. This perception left less to be attributed to another source, resulting in fewer attributions to an influence of the past and, consequently, less feelings of familiarity.
We concluded from this study that the norm or expectation that people use in evaluating their fluency of performance is not a stable standard that is based simply on the type of item (nonword) and applied in a consistent way across stimuli. Instead, as suggested by Kahneman and Miller (1986) in a different context, the norm is computed on the fly. In different processing contexts, people take into account different implications of their processing, applying different standards in evaluating their fluency and arriving at different perceptions of the significance of their processing.
In Experiments 1-4, we have suggested that people compare the actual fluency of their performance with some expectation about how fluently they ought to be able to process such stimuli. Our discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) .
suggests that people always evaluate the coherence of their processing, comparing expectations aroused by some aspects of the event with the unfolding of other aspects and developing an attitude toward their processing. However, this hypothesis does not assume that people always incorporate information about fluency in this process. In tasks other than simple naming, they may instead evaluate their performance on other dimensions. If they do not attend to the fluency of their processing a stimulus, then they may come to quite a different interpretation of their processing than if they do. We tested this idea in the next study.
Experiment 5: Discrepancy and Incongruity
If the explanation that we have offered for the effect of isolated presentation versus rhyming context is correct, then it ought to be possible to cause people to experience the HENSION items as simply incongruous with their context (rather than as either a self-discrepant or coherent processing event). If they experienced their processing as incongruous, we would expect people not to attribute their experience of the event to a source in the past, because the occurrence of incongruity in one's current processing, unlike fluency of processing, is not a likely consequence of prior experience. In consequence, we expected that if we could cause our subjects to perceive their processing of the HENSION items as being incongruous, they would experience very low feelings of familiarity.
To induce a perception of incongruity for the HENSION items, we showed the subjects sentence stems, such as "The old priest gave the nuns his ...," and "The train came roaring out of the ...," followed by a target item. These stems are fairly strongly constrained, allowing the person to expect one of a small number of terminations: "blessing," or "rosary" in the first example, and "tunnel," "switchyard," or perhaps "city" in the second. Regardless of whether the person actually generates an expectation of those words while reading the stem, the words are highly congruent with the sentence context when they occur. We presented such congruent words on one third of test trials. Many other words, if presented at the ends of these sentences, would produce nonsense: for example, "The old priest gave the nuns his TUNNEL," and "The train came roaring out of the BLESSING." In that case, the meaning of the target item is incongruous with the stem. We expected that these presentations would produce much the same feeling as an error in text does, namely a feeling that something is wrong, and consequently produce few false alarms in recognition. We presented incongruous natural word targets on one third of test trials.
On the remaining trials, we presented a nonword after the sentence stem: for example "The old priest gave the nuns his HENSION." In this case, we could expect one of two outcomes. If the subjects evaluated their processing of the nonword in its own right, independent of the context, then they would still perceive discrepancy between the fluency of their production and the ultimate lack of meaning, and they would experience a feeling of familiarity, as in Experiments 1-3. In contrast, if they focused on the meaning of the context and perceived the nonword as incongruous with that meaning, then they might instead simply experience a feeling of wrongness.
Method
Subjects. Fourteen Simon Fraser University students participated in Experiment 5 for a chance to win a lottery.
Procedure. We used the same stimuli as in Experiment 2. In addition, we prepared a set of sentence stems, one for each natural word in the stock. Each stem was coherent with its word. Examples included the following: "He went into the woods carrying his little .. ."(HATCHET); "She often ate her meals in the..." (KITCHEN); and "He became dizzy and lost his..." (BALANCE).
For the training phase, we randomly selected 40 words from the stock and 20 nonwords derived from the remaining word-nonword pairs (e.g., if SINGLE was selected, PINGLE was not selected). These items were presented in the same way as in the last study. In the test, we presented all of the training items plus 40 natural words and 20 nonwords that had not been seen in training (again, only one item from each word-nonword pair was used). On one third of trials, the target item was a word that was coherent with its context (e.g., "On a cold night they use an extra ..." [BLANKET] ). On another third, the target was a word but incongruous with its context. These cases were contrived by randomly repairing target items and contexts, (e.g., "She dug up all the vegetables in the..." [RIDICULE] ; "His error led to scorn and ..." [GARDEN] ). On the remaining trials, the target item was a nonword, (e.g., "She shot him dead with a..." [CLANTER] ); "He worked in the woods as a tree..." [MSTOL] ). Half of the targets in each condition had been presented in the training phase.
On each test trial, the subject was presented a sentence stem, which was centered on the monitor, and allowed 3 s to read it aloud. The screen then blanked and a target item was exposed in the location where it would have been presented if it had been the last word of an intact sentence (i.e., to the right of the screen). Sentence stems began with a capital letter but were otherwise lowercased; target items were presented in uppercase letters. Subjects were asked to pronounce each target, striking a key as they did so, and then to make two decisions: first, whether the sentence as a whole made sense and, second, whether they had seen the target earlier in the study.
Results and Discussion
Novel words were pronounced at about the same latency regardless of their relationship to the context (F < 1; see Table 6 ). Novel nonwords were pronounced about 70 ms slower than both congruent words, F(l, 13) = 4.25, MSE = 9,201.00, and incongruent words, F(l, 13) = 10.36, MSE = 3,510.00. Thus, as usual, words were processed somewhat more fluently than nonwords.
The subjects made 11% fewer false claims of recognition for incongruent than congruent words, although the effect was not reliable, F(l, 13) = 1.26, MSE = 0.04. More important, they made 13% fewer false claims of recognition for nonwords than congruent words, F(l, 13) = 4.54, MSE = 0.03. In fact, the actual rate of false alarms in this study was only 8%, and 10 out of the 14 subjects had a 0% rate of false alarms.
We compared the results of this study with those of Experiment 2, which used the same stimulus set. The HENSION items were pronounced at least as fluently in this study as they were in Experiment 2 (see Tables 3 and 6 ). However, those items fell from 26% false alarms in Experiment 2 to 8% in Experiment 5; words rose from 11% false alarms in Experiment 2 to 21 % in the congruent condition of Experiment 5. In a mixed-factor analysis, we observed no main effect of either stimulus type (word vs. nonword) or sentence context (present vs. absent; F < 1 in both cases), but instead only an interaction, F(l, 30) = 14.95, MSE = 0.30. Thus provision of a semantic context had opposite effects on feelings of familiarity for words and nonwords.
We concluded that the decrease in false alarms for the HENSION items between Experiments 2 and 5 occurred through a change in the subjects' perception of their processing of the targets. In the isolated presentations of Experiment 2, we suspect that they attempted to integrate the fluency qf pronunciation with the meaninglessness of the stimuli, resulting in a perception of discrepancy, as discussed previously. In contrast, encountering those same items after being prepared by the sentence stem to expect some particular meaning, we suspect that the fluency of processing the nonwords was not salient and that, instead, the subjects attempted to integrate the terminal items into the meaning of the stem. In that case, the HENSION items were perceived instead as being incongruous with their contexts.
These results, together with Experiment 4 (rhyme judgments), suggest that people attempt to integrate various aspects of their processing and evaluate the coherence of the result. The outcome of the evaluation process is not unilaterally determined by the structural goodness of the item, or the fluency with which the item is processed; the same items can be experienced as being coherent, discrepant, or incongruous, depending on the context in which they are encountered. Instead, the interpretation process consists of making as much sense as possible about the implications of those aspects of the stimulus event that are noticed, given the context and purpose of the event. The perception of coherence requires no attribution; the perception of incongruity leads to an attribution internal to the event (e.g., "The old priest ... HENSION ... that just doesn't make sense"), whereas the perception of discrepancy requires an attribution external to the event itself, such as to a source in the past. In consequence, the perception of discrepancy selectively produces feelings of familiarity.
Although it was not intended in the design of the experiments, we discovered the same pattern happening (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). with the natural words. Those words attracted 11% false alarms when presented in isolation (Experiment 2) and 10% when incongruous with their contexts (Experiment 5) but 21% when predicted by their contexts (Experiment 5). We have suggested that the fluency of unstudied words presented in isolation (Experiment 2) was experienced as being merely coherent with their meaningfulness, and, of course, words presented incongruously in context (Experiment 5) were likely to be perceived as incongruous. As described earlier, we expected both of these perceptions to lead to low feelings of familiarity, as was observed. We further suspect that an accidental aspect of our procedure caused natural words presented in congruent contexts to be perceived as discrepant, rather than simply coherent, producing the greater feelings of familiarity observed in that condition. In Experiment 5, the stem was shown for 3 s before the target was presented, so that the subjects would have enough time to finish reading the stem before seeing the target. The accidental aspect was that this was long enough that the subjects often finished reading the stem and had to wait before the target was presented. We have since performed a number of studies using only natural words in sentence contexts (Whittlesea & Williams, 1999) . In these studies, we observed that an illusion of familiarity occurs only for words that are (a) actually predicted by their contexts (e.g., "The stormy seas tossed the BOAT" rather than "She saved her money and bought a BOAT"); 0>) one of a class of items predictable from the stem but not specifically predictable (e.g., "The garden was messy with weeds and MOSS" but not "A rolling stone gamers no MOSS"); and (c) presented with a pause inserted between the stem and the presentation of the target (as often happened in the present Experiment 5). We believe that this effect occurs because the pause enables the subjects to anticipate the class of item (when the stem is predictive) but not the specific item. The item, when it occurs, thus fits very well, but surprisingly so because it was not specifically predicted. We think of this effect as being like "waiting for the other shoe to drop." Although strongly anticipated, the dropping of the other shoe is startling, because one does not know when it will occur. Although the surprise engendered by the occurrence of a congruent word following a predictive stem and a pause was caused by a different source than the surprise caused by presenting HENSION in isolation, we believe that both caused the feeling of familiarity through a perception of discrepancy. (See Whitdesea, Williams, & Wright, 1999 and Whittlesea & for a variety of other means of inducing the perception of discrepancy.)
General Discussion
The experiments in this article generalize Whittlesea and Williams' (1998) discrepancy-attribution hypothesis in several ways. First, we have shown that the HENSION items can also produce elevated feelings of familiarity in the hit data but that this effect is obscured by a countervailing tendency to recall words more often than nonwords (Experiment 1). This effect led us to focus on the false-alarm data in analyzing subsequent experiments. Second, we demonstrated that the HENSION effect is not due either to the fluency of those items per se or to their orthographic or phonological relationship to words in general (Experiment 2). Third, we found that the HENSION effect is not influenced by variation in the broad context of the experiment, indicating that the effect has something to do with how people think about the nonword stimuli independent of decisions about other stimuli (Experiment 3). Finally, we observed that variations in local context exercise strong control over the effect. When presented in isolation, the HENSION stimuli are often judged as familiar, even when the subjects have never seen those items in their lives (Experiments 1-3) . We suggested that this occurred because the subjects perceived a discrepancy between the fluency of their processing and the meaninglessness of the stimuli. However, when used to discriminate between a rhyming and a nonrhyming flanker, the same stimuli felt less familiar than when presented in isolation (Experiment 4). We suggested that in that case, the subjects perceived their fluency of processing the HENSION items as being coherent with their ability to use those items to perform another task; because the fluency was less surprising in that case, they had less motive to attribute it to a prior encounter. When presented as the terminal item of a sentence, we observed very low false claims of familiarity for HENSION items (Experiment 5). We suggested that in that case, the subjects perceived those items as being incongruous with the meaning suggested by the sentence stem, rather than as self-discrepant or coherent. Because incongruity, unlike surprising fluency, is not a likely result of prior experience, that perception gave the subjects little motive to attribute the experience of the item to a prior occurrence; in that case, the HENSION items felt wrong, not old.
Our account of familiarity is based on the idea that memory has two primary functions: to construct perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral responses to stimuli and to monitor the coherence of its own processing (cf. Whittlesea, 1997; Whittlesea & Leboe, in press ). The former is automatic and not susceptible to conscious introspection; in consequence, the latter is heuristic and inferential. We suggest that this evaluation process takes place in every stimulus interaction. Its actual purpose is not to check for familiarity of the stimulus, but instead to ensure mat one's construction of the world is proceeding appropriately, that one's perception and comprehension of the flow of stimuli in an event, and one's responses to that event, are on track. The feeling of familiarity that occurs with the perception of discrepancy is a by-product of mis coherence-checking mechanism, a warning that there is something odd or special about the current stimulus event.
Alternative Explanations
The fluency-attribution hypothesis (the idea that people use the fluency of their processing per se as a basis for experiencing familiarity) can explain some of our findings. For example, in Experiment 5 the congruent natural words were most fluently processed and attracted the highest familiarity ratings. However, as discussed earlier, we have other evidence that this occurs only if a pause is inserted between the stem and target (Whittlesea & Williams, 1999) . The occurrence of a pause should make little difference if people only judge items on the basis of the fluency of their performance. In contrast, we suggest that when the terminal word is presented without a pause, it feels merely coherent with its context; when presented after a pause, it seems to fall into place surprisingly well.
The fluency-attribution hypothesis received much support from experiments demonstrating that artificially enhancing the fluency of test processing causes increased claims of recognition (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 1990; Lindsay & Kelley, 1996; Rajaram, 1993; Whittlesea, 1993) . However, in those cases, the fluency was usually enhanced without the subjects' knowledge. We think it likely that in those cases, the subjects did not simply experience great fluency, but rather greater fluency than they expected for those items; that is, they experienced discrepancy for those items. When people are made aware of a clear source of possible influence, as in Jacoby and Whitehouse's (1989) studies described earlier, then they do not use the fluency heuristic, but instead apparently bring a new standard to bear in evaluating the significance of their fluency and report lower feelings of familiarity. 5 The evaluation process that people perform in checking the appropriateness of their processing probably does often take into account the fluency of processing. However, we suggest that fluency does not directly produce the feeling of familiarity. Instead, it is one of many aspects of processing that can be compared with others, depending on the task, in evaluating the coherence of current processing.
It has been suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer that another alternative hypothesis to explain the HENSION effect is that those items are harder to reject when new than are the natural words because they have phonological or orthographic attributes that are more similar to the study list in general. Against that idea, the effect was as large in Experiment 3e (only HENSION items in study and test) as it was when various kinds of words were presented (Experiments 3a-3d). In that case, new and old HENSION items must resemble the training list equally. Further, that idea could not explain the decrease in judged familiarity (in both hits and false alarms) in Experiment 4 when target items were succeeded by a rhyme judgment. If the effect of that manipulation were to make those items somehow more distinctive and, hence easier to reject when new, it should also make the items easier to accept when old, contrary to the observed pattern of response. Finally, it does not explain why the same items, following the same training list, attracted very high rates of false alarms when presented in isolation (Experiments 1-3) but very low rates of false alarms when presented at the end of a sentence stem (Experiment 5).
Although the similarity-to-training-list idea does not explain the variety of findings in these experiments, it might explain false familiarity in other studies, such as the Deese (1959) effect (Arndt & Hirshman, 1998) . That effect is produced by presenting a list of related words, such as DREAM, NIGHT, BED, and so forth. Following such a list, an unstudied but related word such as SLEEP produces a false sense of familiarity, producing extra false alarms (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) . The effect clearly has something to do with the semantic relatedness of the target to the list. However, we suspect that this effect is also caused by the perception of discrepancy, which is induced in a different way than we have done. We suggest that the semantic relatedness of the unstudied target to the training list causes its semantic features to come to mind easily but that this factor does not strongly affect the fluency of perceiving it. That is, in this case, the semantic features come to mind more easily than would be expected on the basis of the fluency of perceiving the test word, which is the reverse of what happens with the HENSION stimuli. Unlike our studies, the Deese paradigm encourages subjects to think about the items as members of categories during the training phase. In that context, surprisingly fluent generation of semantic features may be unconsciously attributed to a prior experience of thinking of those features, producing a conscious feeling of familiarity. If this idea is correct, then the Deese effect is not produced simply by the similarity of the semantic features of the unstudied target to the semantic features of the set of training items but by the perceived discrepancy between the ease of generating semantic features for that item relative to the ease of perceiving it. (For another example of feelings of familiarity produced by surprisingly good nonperceptual processing following nonfluent perceptual processing, see Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, Experiments 1 and 2.) We admit that the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis is somewhat vague as yet. We cannot directly measure the subjects' perceptions of their processing as discrepant, coherent, or incongruous, because those perceptions are thought to be unconscious. We can only infer these various perceptions from their outcomes in judgments of familiarity in various conditions. However, we can think of no other way in which the pattern of our results can be explained. We believe that the perception of discrepancy, controlled by the characteristics of the local context and task, is the fundamental basis of feelings of familiarity. Marcel (1983) described consciousness as relying on unconscious attributional processes that "make sense of as much data as possible at the most functionally useful level" (p. 238). Our evidence supports that conclusion. We simply add that people also try to make sense of the quality of their processing of the data; that the latter produces the perception of coherence, incongruity, or discrepancy; and that the latter perception is responsible for the occurrence of feelings of familiarity. Familiarity, "Just Knowing," and "JustRemembering" As noted in the introduction, the feeling of familiarity has a curious relationship to the act of remembering. People can use that feeling to make judgments about their past experience, and (when the situation is not rigged to produce illusions) it is ordinarily a good basis for making such decisions. Moreover, it is the essential phenomenological experience of remembering: It is the feeling that some aspect of one's present experience has been experienced before. However, it is a feeling that often does not occur when actual remembering takes place.
Feelings of
Many psychological properties are constructed and experienced, not as events in their own right but as a part of the experience of something else. An example is the computation of depth information in a visual environment. In encountering a dog, I know how far away it is, in the sense that I can behave appropriately toward it, extending my hand the right distance to pat it. I could also tell you how far away it is if asked. However, it is rare to have a strong, conscious sense that there is depth in the current environment. That feeling can occur: It happens, for example, when looking at one of Escher's drawings of impossible scenes (Locher, 1971) or examining a topographical map through a stereoscope, apparently seeing downward an immense distance while sitting at a desk. The spontaneous, conscious "feeling of depth" as an entity in its own right is a rare event and is primarily experienced when discrepant elements of the environment cannot be integrated.
In the same way, although people constantly deal with objectively familiar stimuli, and their prior experience of those stimuli drives their current performance, the feeling of familiarity as a strong, conscious subjective state is a fairly rare event in ordinary life. It does not occur in interacting with well-known stimuli in their normal environments. For example, one does not experience a powerful feeling of "I've experienced this before," in encountering one's spouse in one's kitchen, or in buying a newspaper from the clerk in the corner store. In those cases, processing proceeds very fluently, identifying the objects and people in the situation and performing appropriate activities. The fact that one has encountered those people and objects before in those contexts is what permits that processing to proceed fluently, and if asked, one could certainly report their identities. But that processing is not accompanied by a feeling of familiarity, a direct awareness that one has experienced those stimuli previously. One "just knows" who those people are, without experiencing a subjective feeling of knowing: One's knowledge of the identities of those present is subsumed into the meaning of the overall stimulus interaction. The fact that those people are objectively familiar remains a part of the background of the situation and does not attract attention. Instead, the feeling of familiarity occurs when elements of the situation are discrepant. For example, if one encounters the clerk from the comer store on a bus, dressed in civilian clothes, one may fail to identify the individual. In that case, one is likely to experience a feeling of familiarity. That feeling is due in part to fluent perception of the clerk's face but that fluency is no greater (probably less) than it was when the individual was met in the store. Instead, the feeling is produced by the discrepancy between fluent processing and a context in which all people should be strangers.
Just as one can "just know" familiar stimuli in the present environment without experiencing a feeling of familiarity, so too one can remember the past without a feeling of familiarity. For example, if you ask someone to give their life history, they are likely to tell a long story, filled with places, names, and events. This story mostly proceeds smoothly from element to element, "I spent the next four years at university, and then got a job at Techshop." If you stop a person in this part of the account and ask, "Are you sure?", they are likely to reply, "Yes of course, I remember it." If you ask, "Does what you just told me feel familiar, that you spent four years at university?", the question will be treated as a strange one, much as people regard it as strange to be asked if their spouse feels familiar, "Well, I know it's true, if that's what you mean." In this mode, the person is "just remembering" their life history. Each element in the story proceeds smoothly from the last and sets up the next; each thought is concordant with the others. While this coherent flow persists, the teller may experience sadness, joy, or nostalgia, but not a feeling that the subject matter is familiar.
However, at some points in the story, the flow breaks down, "and then Sue moved to ... Boston? No ... Baltimore? Yeah, to Baltimore, I think." Unlike the production of earlier information, this statement is not supported by convergence of other elements. Baltimore has come to mind fluently, without any apparent reason for it to do so. That produces discrepancy between current processing and the local context. At this point, whether right or wrong, the person feels Baltimore to be familiar. Again you can ask, "Are you sure? Does it feel familiar?" This time, the response is "Yeah, pretty sure, that feels right." The question about a feeling of familiarity makes sense when the person is in doubt. Then comes the switch back to just remembering: "Oh yeah, she lived on Sycamore Street, beside the old library." With the corning-to-mind of consistent, related elements, the target ceases to feel familiar and becomes simply part of one's knowledge of the past. "Are you sure?" "Yeah, I remember it now." 7 6 This is not Tulving's (1985) "remember-know" distinction. In studies using that dichotomy (see Experiment 1), subjects are asked to say "remember" if they have clear memory of a test item and to say "know" when they have a feeling that the item is old but no clear recollection. Thus, Tulving's know judgment actually corresponds to the feeling of familiarity described in this article, whereas his remember judgment is closer to the just-know and just-remember activities described here. 7 The distinction between just knowing and just remembering is vague. It has been common for the last couple of decades to make a strong separation between knowing and remembering and between concepts and events, partly because of the popularity of the "semantic-episodic" distinction (e.g., Tulving, 1995) . However, there are borderline cases, If a person reports "I lived there for four years, until we moved to Ohio. We were very happy there," are they remembering or reporting knowledge? We suggest mat the knowingremembering dichotomy does not reflect people's experience of One might imagine from the foregoing discussion that the only difference between the states of feeling of familiarity and just remembering is the degree of certainty the person feels: that the feeling of familiarity, occurring in the absence of recollected corroborative detail, is simply a lowconfidence act of remembering. However, that feeling often occurs very powerfully, with much greater affect than that which accompanies actual remembrance. For example, seeing a person on a bus, one may think, "I know I've seen her before. Who is she?" In contrast, if one actually knows the person's identity, there is no such vehemence in the proclamation: "I know who that is. It's Fred." In the state of subjective familiarity, the fact of familiarity is the focal characteristic and may be experienced with great force; in contrast, in the just-remembering state, the fact of familiarity is backgrounded to the knowledge of identity that the remembering produces. The person's confidence that their act of remembering is valid may be greater when they are just remembering than when they only feel a stimulus to be familiar, but the latter can be experienced with a passion not felt in the former. We believe that this difference reflects the underlying states of the perception of coherence versus discrepancy. Mandler (e.g., 1980 Mandler (e.g., , 1991 drew a distinction between two bases of recognition: familiarity-based responding (based on intraitem integration) and recall of context (based on integration of the item with contextual detail). This dichotomy has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the Process Dissociation Paradigm (e.g., Jacoby, 1991 Jacoby, , 1996 , by which familiarity is understood to be an automatic consequence of item processing, and retrieval of context is argued to be a controlled process. The issue of automatic versus controlled processes is an important one. However, that is not the distinction we are striving to make here. Instead, we are trying to contrast the phenomenological states that can accompany processing against the behavioral consequences of stimulating memory. We argue that the phenomenological state of familiarity is not associated only with context-free, item-based processing but instead with any processing that is experienced as discrepant.
The Role of Item and Context in Producing the Feeling of Familiarity
An encounter with a familiar object, such as a natural word or the face of a friend, stimulates memory to produce the identity of the object. This coming-to-mind of the identity is the behavioral consequence of one's prior experience with that object. Equally, the object, its perceived identity, or both, can serve as a cue to produce the identity of a context in which that object was encountered on some prior occasion. These two cases differ in terms of the mental content of which the person becomes aware (respectively, the identity of the object versus the identity of the prior context). However, they are the same in an important way: their memories well, just as the semantic-episodic distinction does not capture well the performance controlled by their memories (cf. Whittlesea, 1997; Whittlesea & Leboe, in press ).
Memory, when cued with a stimulus, produces some information relevant to the stimulus.
People can produce either identity or context information without any feeling of familiarity (just remembering the information) "That's Fred" (production of item identity); "that's the guy I see at work" (production of general, repeated context); or "that's the guy who delivered the pizza last night" (production of specific, unique context). Moreover, people can use the production of that information to answer questions about the past, again without experiencing a feeling of familiarity-The only difference between the use of identity and context information for this purpose is that, owing to the greater specificity of the latter, context can be used to make more refined and discriminative responses about past encounters. Production of the identity of the stimulus without context only permits one to answer whether or not one has any prior experience of the object across the life span (to discriminate between known and unknown objects, as in a lexical decision task). In contrast, production of contextual information permits more selective responding about prior experience, either about a class of interactions with a stimulus (general context) or a particular event (specific context). Tlie use of contextual information to perform judgments about the past is not qualitatively different from the use of identity; it is not more controlled or produced through a different set of procedures. It is simply information that permits a more discriminative response to more specific questions (cf. Gruppuso, Kelley, & Lindsay, 1997; Leboe & Whittlesea, 1999 , for a more extended discussion of this issue).
What is important to us is that both the act of producing the identity of a stimulus and the act of producing contextual information can be experienced either with or without a feeling of familiarity. As we have shown in the experiments in this article, items can feel familiar even when there is no prior context to produce (false alarms), if the person perceives discrepancy between aspects of their current processing. In contrast, when no discrepancy is experienced, the person often does not experience the subjective state of familiarity, even when remembering accurately. Similarly, we argue that contexts are often reproduced from memory without causing any feeling of familiarity about either the item or the context (as in the just-knowing and justremembering examples given earlier). However, contextual information can also cause the person to experience a feeling of familiarity: Encountering a stimulus in a context that is unusual for that stimulus (e.g., the clerk on the bus) can cause this. So can the production of a context from memory, if that production itself is not coherent with other thoughts. For example, one might attend the wedding of one's friend, Mark, and at that wedding meet and talk with his mother. Meeting the mother on a later occasion, her identity fails to come to mind, and so does the wedding, but the name "Mark" does. This is in fact production of contextual information but it is unsupported by the production of consistent detail about the relationship between Mark and this woman. In this case, one is likely to experience a feeling of familiarity, "Mark? Why does that woman remind me of Mark?" In contrast, if all of the detail comes to mind, one just remembers, without a feeling of familiarity, "Oh, there's Mark's mother. You know her; we met her at the wedding." Therefore, we argue that the production of contextual information is not an alternative basis to feelings of familiarity in performing recognition. It is an alternative to the use of item identity information to answer questions about the past. But the feeling of familiarity can be equally produced by processing of the item per se and processing of contextual detail, just as both can be processed without causing that feeling. The important factor producing the phenomenological reaction of familiarity is that the person experiences some discrepancy in the event: between initial and later processing of the item, between the item and context, or between initial and later processing of the context that comes to mind.
Monitoring of Coherence: A General Mechanism of Subjective Experience?
We believe that the factor that separates the feeling of familiarity (and other subjective states) from just knowing and just remembering is the perceived coherence of processing. When the various components of a processing experience are perceived to fit together coherently, no particular subjective state occurs: People simply continue with their current activity. However, when a discrepancy is perceived between two parts of an experience, people switch over to an introspective, reflective state, attempting to reconcile the discrepancy and attribute it to some causal factor. In doing so, they experience a phenomenological reaction.
A reflective reaction appears to be the inevitable consequence of perceiving failure of coherence, but the nature of mat reaction can vary considerably. Let us modify the example of the clerk from the corner store getting on one's bus. Now the individual appears in uniform, so that one can instantly make an identification, and know from what context the association arises. The clerk does not cause a feeling of familiarity: you just know who the individual is. However, the clerk is still discrepant within that context: Knowing the individual's identity does not fit with one's expectations about the bus (it should be full of strangers). That perception of discrepancy produces an (illogical) response: "What's she doing here?", as though this person spends his or her entire existence in the store. The perception of discrepancy produces an orienting or startle response that requires an attribution.
The monitoring function that produces the perception of discrepancy is also probably responsible for the detection and correction of error in people's performance: for example when a person committing an error in speech pauses to correct the error. lake as an example a person reading a story that contains the following: "They had a lovely day at the beach. Hie setting sun was brilliant, and the towering clouds found careless rapture in each others' arms." The reader is likely to pause part way through the last clause, reacting to the shift in meaning flow. The pause indicates detection of inconsistency in processing. The inability to incorporate a subsequent idea into the developing theme causes a perception of incongruity. That perception creates a feeling state, "something's wrong"; it also motivates an attribution to some source and perhaps some corrective action. In the example, the reader might attribute the problem externally-to an omission of some words from the text-and attempt to supply the missing words. Alternatively, the reader might attribute the problem internally-to a failure to understand a poetic conceit expressing the beauty of the day-and attempt to think of clouds as lovers. 8 In general, people can experience disparity between item and context, expectation and outcome, fluency and identity, intention and behavior, meaning and form, and a host of other characteristics of experience. We suspect that the perception of discrepancy can occur in any aspect of mental or overt activity, producing a wide variety of adaptive responses. We suspect that this is the fundamental source of many phenomenological reactions, including the feeling of knowing (e.g., Koriat, 1993; Reder & Ritter, 1992) ; the feelings of pleasantness (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Zajonc, 1980) , comprehension (Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982) , and credibility (Begg & Armour, 1991) ; and the erroneous external and internal attributions seen in source monitoring (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) and autobiographical memory (Hyman & Pendand, 1996; Loftus & Rosenwald, 1995) . We also suspect that, in addition to controlling the occurrence of subjective states, the perception of coherence and discrepancy is a major moderating variable controlling people's behavior in classification and identification (e.g., Whittlesea, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea & Leboe, in press ).
Summary
We are starting to understand the evaluation and attribution of discrepancy as a crude but generally robust mechanism that serves the important function of alerting people to stimuli that require special attention. This mechanism enables people to avoid experiencing a subjective state of familiarity in two important situations: when unknown objects are nonfluently processed (strangers on a bus) and when well-known objects are fluently processed in wellknown, appropriate tasks and contexts (spouse in the kitchen). It also enables them to experience an appropriate, strong feeling of familiarity when a known stimulus is encountered unexpectedly (meeting one of your students on a bus) and to experience shock when an unfamiliar stimulus occurs in a familiar context (burglar encountered in the kitchen). It is a heuristic, inferential process that makes systematic errors and does not incorporate all normatively 8 It is often difficult to know in advance what people will interpret as being coherent, discrepant, or incongruous. That perception depends not just on the formal, logical relationships among elements of a stimulus complex but also on the construction the person places on the event. This is nicely demonstrated by the Moses illusion (e.g., "How many animals of each type did Moses put on the ark?"; Barton & Sanford, 1993) . If a person fails to spot the anomalous "Moses" (for "Noah"), they will perceive the question as coherent; if they do spot it, they will perceive the question as incongruous. The factors that determine which of these outcomes will occur appear to be legion. However, there appear to be only three basic outcomes of the evaluation process: the perception of coherence, incongruity, or discrepancy. important information (e.g., regular nonwords falsely experienced as familiar). However, it is a mechanism that generally works well, simply because discrepancy of processing normally is associated with a problem mat requires attention.
